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Moral Perfection and the Demand for Human 
Enhancement1 
Adriana Warmbier ( Jagiellonian University) 
“Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; 
for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so 
that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if 
the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a 
certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or 
temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when 
he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly 
he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and 
thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable 
character. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the 
possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a 
condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or 
no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for 
everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing 
just and temperate acts.” 
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics2  
 
1. Naturalism, human agency, and the idea of moral enhancement 
Recent developments in neuroscience, genetics, and psychology have 
significantly increased the range of potential uses of biomedical technologies. 
What used to be implemented simply to maintain or restore health may now 
allow us to expand human capacities above normal levels. The growth of 
knowledge provides people with means which may have an important 
influence on their standard of living. The very attempt to improve one’s 
quality of life does not seem in itself to raise a moral dilemma. After all, as 
soon as we are fully conscious we start to pose the question: what do I ought 
to do to make my life meaningful or fulfilling, and what do I owe to others? We 
discover in ourselves both the desire for personal development, including 
moral attitudes, and the fact that we are subject to norms and moral 
judgment3. Already Plato and Aristotle believed that striving for perfection is 
an integral part of growing up. Being human entails learning virtue, which 
                                                             
1 The writing of this article was funded by the Polish National Science Centre 
(2012/07/D/HS1/01099). 
2 Aristotle 2009, 1105b 
3 On the active and passive aspects of our nature in terms of morality see Korsgaard 
1989, 101-132.   
Adriana Warmbier
 
 
2 
 
they thought to be a kind of excellence. We may all agree that this tendency is 
still present, whether we assume it derives from our nature or not. We 
constantly deliberate on ways in which we could be better, more perfect, and 
far different fom what in fact we are4. Yet since the ancients our approach to 
values and understanding of morality itself has changed significantly.  
There are many reasons for this transformation. The pivotal one is, as 
Bernard Williams puts it, “that contemporary views about morality itself leave 
an unclarity about what qualities of mind or character are particularly called 
upon in constructive moral thought (indeed, in some accounts of morality it is 
not even clear that there can be such a thing as constructive moral thought).”5. 
With regard to this statement, there are two things to be mentioned here at 
the outset. First, leaving aside those accounts of morality in which the 
possibility of constructive consideration of the moral kind is discarded, we 
may indicate two main tendencies in contemporary takes on what morality is. 
Generally speaking, one evolved from Aristotelian anthropology or Kantian 
ethics, and the other is based on reductionism of various kinds6.  
Second, whichever tendency we choose to pursue in our investigation 
into morality, and whichever sense of this concept, broad or narrow sense, we 
choose to adopt, we cannot evaide the question of what it is to be a human 
agent, or a self. The themes of morality and agency (selfhood) are inextricably 
intertwined7. But just as there is more than one understanding of the concept 
of morality, so will there be miscellaneous depictions and strands of the 
notion of human agency.  
In this article I shall not attempt to discuss all the philosophical 
accounts of a person or self. What I want to bring out and examine are the 
conditions of possibility of moral agency, in other words, the possibility of 
self-understanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for their 
actions to themselves. These two issues, the acting subject and the attribution 
of authorship, are integrally related. In exploring this theme I shall turn to the 
                                                             
4 Korsgaard 2013. In particular see the Prologue in Excellence and obligation: a very 
concise history of western metaphysics 387 BC to 1887 AD. 
5 Williams 1996, XVIII. On this subject see also Williams 2006.  
6 The effects of the first tendency may be called an attempt to plot a course between the 
two theories by showing the insufficiency of each and by bringing out their similarities. 
7 See Taylor 1994. 
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idea of human enhancement, which is one of the major topics of contemporary 
debate in practical ethics. As this is a vast and complex field, I shall 
concentrate only on one important aspect, namely, moral enhancement.  
If we are to discuss the idea of moral enhancement, we must start by 
examining two substantial issues8. The first one refers to the assumption 
underlying this idea. According to the account of moral enhancement given by 
Thomas Douglas, who suggests that the enhanced person is expected to have 
morally better motives than she had before the alteration9, one may ask what 
would make us think that biomediacal interventions might result in having 
“morally better motives” when morality is regarded as being based on set of 
beliefs, moral norms, and rational considerations. In other words, it derives 
from the “capacity for reflective self-evaluation”10. The second issue is that of, 
what acting morally actually involves? My claim is that the idea of moral 
enhancement, which some may regard as very promising (in particular in 
terms of improving moral decision-making processes) is founded on a certain 
picture of the human being. This picture derives from a reductionist research 
programme11 that refers to a very narrow form of naturalism. An accurate 
depiction of this sort of naturalism can be found in John McDowell’s Mind and 
World. The author states that this naturalism “equates disclosing how 
something fits into nature with placing it in the realm of law”12. Those who 
consider moral enhancement as an alternative means of improving our moral 
capacities embrace naturalism in its narrow form, with its reductionist 
tendency.  
 As I mentioned above, this sort of naturalism has significant 
consequences. It is more than just one of the views about the language of 
                                                             
8 When considering moral enhancement, John Harris begins with these questions: 
“what is moral enhancement and what does it have to do with ethical knowledge, if 
there is such a thing, or with ethical expertise; and what do all of these have to do with 
knowledge of ethics or morality?” Harris 2011, 104. 
9 Douglas 2008. 
10 See Frankfurt 1971, 7. 
11 Of course, there is not one reductionist research programme. One may point out 
various forms of reductionism, depending on what is said to be reducible to what. For a 
brief account, see Haack 2014.   
12 McDowell 1996, 88. 
Adriana Warmbier
 
 
4 
 
science. It ramifies into the very comprehension of human agency13. A number 
of various and influential accounts have been put forth explaining the nature 
of moral enhancement and the reasons for seeking it14. In what follows, I 
would like to show that the heart of the controversy that pertains to the idea 
of moral enhancement lies in the issue which is often sidestepped or just not 
properly introduced by the proponents of biomedical enhancement, namely 
the complex character of the basis of moral decision making. We may agree 
that this complexity consists in the determining and non-determing factors 
which take part in the process of evaluating reasons that are taken into 
account in our moral choices.  
The idea of moral enhancement should provide us with a conception of 
what exactly is claimed to be enhanced and what the consequences of it are. I 
shall focus my attention on the realm of moral decisions making. First, I will 
support the thesis that genetic endowments does not play a dominant role in 
the process of making moral choices. Second, in answering the questions of 
what are the conditions of self-understanding and what it is to be an 
autonomous and responsible agent, I shall argue that the idea of moral 
enhancement fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor 
that plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through 
biomedical or genetic interventions, will increase the probability of having 
“morally better future motives”. 
 
2. Autonomy, rationality, and freedom of the will  
 
“For reason recognizes as its highest practical function the 
establishment of a good will, whereby in the attainment of this 
end reason is capable only of its own kind of satisfaction, viz., that 
of fulfilling a purpose which is in turn determined only by reason, 
even though such fulfilment were often to interfere with the 
purposes of inclination.” 
I. Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals15 
 
Tadeusz Kotarbiński claimed that human autonomy involves two 
fundamental concepts: rationality and freedom of the will. Moreover, he 
                                                             
13 See Taylor 1985. 
14 See Douglas 2008, Persson, Savulescu 2012, Daniels 2013, Walker 2009. 
15 Kant 1993, 9.  
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suggested, that these two notions are related, one cannot go without the other. 
A similar conviction may be found in the anscient thought, where the ideas of 
moral action and reflection were regarded as inextricably connected. In line 
with this kind of thinking,, let me invoke the meaning of the term “rationality”. 
It is usually taken in two senses, namely “purposefulness” and 
“meaningfulness”. The concept of rationality is confined to the framework of 
discursive cognition. “A rational demand is a demand which has a meaning, and 
this, in turn, signifies that the demand has been well thought over, justified, and 
– again! – properly subordinated to the intended goal”16. This is what Aristotle 
means when he states that a normal, mature human being is rational. The 
realm of rationality entails an agent equipped with a responsiveness to 
reasons. If we lacked this capacity for responsiveness we would not be able to 
refer to and take into consideration the whole framework of our intentions, 
motives, and inclinations. This is precisely what is essential in the concept of 
freedom of free will: being capable of “reflective self-evaluation”. In other 
words, the primary meaning of the notion of freedom is not “to be free to 
choose”, but the very ability to be critically aware both of the difference 
between what Kant calls the “purposes of reason” and the “purposes of 
inclination” and of he experience of being capable of directing one’s own 
intention.  
Since moral consideration involves the concept of agency, I shall turn 
again to Aristotle. He puts forward an idea of what it is to be a free agent by 
introducing the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. Let me 
take a closer look at this distinction now, as it may shed light on some 
important problems concerning the question of self-understanding, acting 
subjects. In The Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle asserts:    
“Since that which is done by force or by reason of ignorance is 
involuntary, the voluntary would seem to be that of which the 
moving principle is in the agent himself, he being aware of the 
particular circumstances of the action […] We deliberate about 
things that are in our power and can be done; and these are in fact 
what is left”17. 
                                                             
16 Stróżewski 2013, 282-283.   
17 Aristotle 2009, 1111a, 1112b. 
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It is to voluntary action that practical intellect directs itself. This kind of 
action involves two important factors, namely “intention” (choice) and 
“deliberation”, which complete themselves within the sphere of conscious 
subjective experience. For the “act of intention”, Aristotle uses the term 
proairesis and for the “act of deliberation”, he uses the term bouleusis18. 
Considering these two factors, the essential point is their mutual dependence. 
Aristotle argues that when one deliberates and decides as a result of 
deliberation, then one desires (has the intention of doing certain things) in 
accord with this deliberation. The very thing they desire after deliberation is 
proaireton. Thus deliberation completes itself by the act of proairesis 
(intention). The proaireton is one of the things within our power which is 
desired after deliberation19.  
What Aristotle emphasizes here is that deliberation fulfils itself only in 
the act of proairesis. In explaining the meaning of proairesis he presents us 
with the following phrases: “desiderative reason” or “ratiocinative desire”20. 
Thus the act of choosing – proairesis – may be effected only by involving both 
reason and desire with a view to an end. “Deliberate desire” introduces into 
the concept of proairesis the appetitive moment. There can be no question that 
in the effort to capture the significance of the act of choice Aristotle focuses 
our attention on the unified and integrated action of the two sorts of abilities. 
As Grimaldi comments: “Aristotle leads up to this statement by demonstrating 
that the appetitive element must enter into proairesis since choice has its 
origin in both desire and reason, for reason by itself will not cause action”21.  
“When we have reached a judgement as a result of deliberation, 
we desire in accordance with our deliberation”22. 
Thus the Aristotelian model of action consists in a dialectical 
dependence between deliberation and desire. Our decisions, especially moral 
decisions, are based upon thoughts that we hold as prior. What is vital in these 
ancient grasp of the concept of “deliberate desire” and what pushes me 
                                                             
18 See Aristotle 2009, 1111b, 4–1112a 16,  1112a 17-1113a 14. 
19 I am relying on the commentary on Aristotle written by Grimaldi 1972, 26. 
20 Aristotle 2009, 1139b 4. 
21 Grimaldi 1972, 26. 
22 Aristotle 2009, 1113a. Grimaldi translates these phrases as: “desireful reason” and 
“reasonable desire”. Grimaldi 1972, 26. 
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towards Aristotle’s model of action, is that it demonstrates the condition sine 
qua non of morality. Not only does it emphasizes the complexity of conscious 
actions, which are undersood to be the result of a “chain of intentions and 
considerations that weigh up ends and alternative means in light of 
opportunities, resources, and obstacles”23, but in the first place it addresses the 
active aspect of our nature, namely, it brings out the agency of persons, the 
reflective self.     
 The structure of the reflective will, which I shall also call the 
axiological structure of agency, is by its nature determined by its inner 
relation to values24. Due to this, I say that it is only within the reflective will 
that freedom may be claimed to implement itself. The internal connection to 
reasons and norms turns our act of choosing into a free action, and hence 
constitutes morality. The main task of the axiological structure of agency 
consists in its teleological character. Its most important determining factor is 
the attitude of the agent, towards the choice of values and their realisation 
within oneself25. The approach to reasons, norms and values is of a specific 
kind. Let me invoke its detailed description which Władysław Stróżewski 
gives in his text Axiological Structure of Human Being.  
The axiological structure of agency is: 1. radically individualistic; 2. It 
comprises various types of values (not only moral ones); 3. It is hierarchical; 4. 
It comprises both positive and negative values; 5. It contains both 
deterministic and indeterministic factors; 6. It is dynamic; 7. It is dialectical; 8. 
It is made up of both actually existing and potential values, as well as of both 
realized and merely postulated values; 9. It may be characterized by both the 
harmony and disharmony of its component elements; 10. It is teleological in 
character: its most significant “determining” factor is the agent’s attitude 
towards values26. What I am claiming here is that an adequate explanation of 
moral action must take into account the aforementioned broad contexts of 
                                                             
23 Habermas 2008, 155. 
24 I borrow this phrase from Władysław Stróżewski who uses it precisely as “ the 
axiological structure of man” (or of a human being). See Stróżewski 2013, 257-271. 
25 Ibidem, 270. See also the Habermas critique of Libet’s experiments. Habermas 2008, 
154-166. 
26 See Stróżewski 2013, 258. 
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reflectiveness. Keeping in mind this essential characteristic of the axiological 
structure of agency I shall now discuss the idea of moral enhancement.  
Thomas Douglas presented the following accounts of moral 
enhancement:  
“There are various ways in which we could understand the 
suggestion that we morally enhance ourselves. To name a few, we 
could take it as a suggestion that we make ourselves more 
virtuous, more praiseworthy, more capable of moral 
responsibility, or that we make ourselves act or behave more 
morally. But I will understand it in none of these ways. Rather, I 
will take it as a suggestion that we cause ourselves to have 
morally better motives […]. I understand motives to be the 
psychological – mental or neural – states or processes that will, 
given the absence of opposing motives, cause a person to act”27. 
The radical version of this account is offered by Ingmar Persson and 
Julian Savulescu who claim that cognitive improvement should be 
accompanied by an extensive moral enhancement of humankind. Thus we 
need to explore the possibility of using the “science of morality” to develop 
and apply means of enhancing our “moral dispositions” Of course, they 
acknowledge the possibility of moral enhancement through self education and 
social reform, but since this does not seem to be effective, they focus on what 
they call “moral bioenhancement”, by which they mean the modification of 
individuals’ moral psychology through the application of pharmacology, 
neuroscience, and genetic selection or modification. 
 
“At the very least, the perils of cognitive enhancement require a 
vigorous research program on understanding the biological 
underpinnings of moral behaviour. As Hawking quipped, our 
future may depend on making ourselves wiser and less aggressive. 
If safe moral enhancements are ever developed, there are strong 
reasons to believe that their use should be obligatory, like 
education or fluoride in the water, since those who should take 
them are least likely to be inclined to use them. That is, safe, 
effective moral enhancement would be compulsory”28. 
In another text Savulescu and Persson argue: 
“To be morally enhanced is to have those dispositions which make 
it more likely that one will arrive at the correct judgment of what 
it is right to do and more likely to act on that judgment”29.  
                                                             
27 Douglas 2008, 229. 
28 Persson, Savulescu 2008, 174. 
29 Savulescu, Persson 2012, 403. 
Adriana Warmbier
 
9 
 
Mark Walker puts forward the Genetic Virtue Project which 
proposes to discover and enhance morality using biotechnology genetic 
correlates of virtuous behavior. His arguments rely on the assumption 
that virtues have biological correlates. 
“The companions in innocence point applies to the idea of 
promoting virtue: much of our (pre-theoretic) ethical practice 
assumes that virtues are important. An enormous amount of 
energy is spent attempting to socialize people into being virtuous, 
as in teaching children to be truthful, just, and caring. If the 
“Genetic Virtue Project” is wrong in attempting to promote virtue 
as a means of making people morally better, then much current 
socialization and education is mistaken as well”30. 
The main problems that spring from such an approach are as follows: 
1. The transhumanist standpoint addresses only one side of our nature, 
namely its passive aspect, which consists in the fact that we encounter the 
existence of deterministic factors such as goals of inclinations, various 
emotions, or feelings. But these factors, even though they contribute to moral 
action, do not determine normativity itself. Since normativity derives from 
reflection, which in turn reveals the individual’s relation towards reasons and 
values, the transhumanist premises lead to substantial disagreement in 
viewing morality. They tend to follow the Darwinian approach, according to 
which moral insight is something that one regards as happening to them, 
something that is an object of one’s experience, whereas moral norms do not, 
in fact, originate from our inclinations or psychical dispositions31. That is why 
the idea of moral enhancement pertains only to the outer (mainly biomedical) 
means of controlling and influencing “moral dispositions” and behavior. I 
endorse Harris’s remark that there is mischief in the meaning of the words 
”safe and effective” moral enhancement32. One may wonder what is actually 
claimed here to ought to remain “safe and effective”.  
 
2. The aforementioned issue generates other difficulties. Since the proponents 
of biomedical enhancement focus their attention on our behavior and not on 
                                                             
30 Walker 2009, 35. 
31 I am grateful to Prof. Robert Piłat for reminding me of this important point. He 
discusses it thoroughly in Refleksja i kompetencja moralna and O kruchosci refleksji. See 
Piłat 2013, 169-188, 15-24. See also Korsgaard 1989.  
32 See Harris 2011, 106. 
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moral action itself which entails agency, they omit the important distinction 
between having the inclination toward something and the process of 
espousing and justifying one’s beliefs. In search of a satisfactory image which 
could elucidate the significance of this distinction, let me invoke Frankfurt’s 
concept of double-leveled consciousness33. His distinction between “first-
order desires” and “second-order desires” allows us not only to reflect on the 
groundings of our beliefs, choices, policies, and sorts of motives, but in the 
first place it addresses the question of the essential features of consciousness, 
namely of intentionality and self-awarness. These in turn point to the active 
aspect of our nature, which is moral agency. That is not, of course, to suggest 
that those who oppose the idea of moral bioenhancement disregard the 
contribution of deterministic factors. These are indeed taken into account, but 
that does not mean that they determine the act of choosing itself. For instance, 
Habermas applies a nondeterministic concept of conditioned freedom, he 
argues that “the conditioned character of my decision does not bother me as 
long as I can understand this “occurrence” retrospectively as an unfolding 
process of reflection (however implicit) in which I take part as a participant in 
discourse or as a subject reflecting in foro interno. For in that case I make the 
decision based on my own understanding”34. What is claimed here is that we 
humans possess certain capacities that other creatures do not, the most 
significant of these being self-awareness – a particular approach towards 
ourselves, the possibility of us distancing ourselves as moral agents from the 
deterministic factors of our “first nature”. That is why McDowell may say:  
“In imparting logos, moral education enables one to step back 
from any motivational impulse one finds oneself subject to, and 
question its rational credentials. Thus it effects a kind of 
distancing of the agent from the practical tendencies that are 
part of what we might call his first nature. Nature controls the 
behaviour of a non-rational animal. It seemed that reason 
compels nature to abdicate that authority, leaving a void that 
self-interest seemed fitted to fill”35. 
                                                             
33 Frankfurt 1971, 5-20.   
34 Habermas 2008, 158. 
35 McDowell 2002, 188. 
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This very possibility of us distancing ourselves points to the capacity for 
“evaluating” which is a reflective kind. This is the idea Frankfurt calls 
“reflective-self-evaluation” which manifests in the formation of second-order 
desires.   
 
3. Transhumanists adopt a different approach to virtue. They do not think of it 
in terms of its teleological sense (hexis proairetiké), but they define it usually in 
psychological terms as a state of mind created by various kinds of emotions. 
Such an attitude fails to explain the reasons for holding certain beliefs according 
to which one decides to act. What is left out in the idea of moral enhancement 
is that virtuous action results in the first place from our recognition and 
acknowledgement of norms and values rather than from our habits. But, of 
course, the recognition of norms does not determine action. There are many 
reasons for this; some of them have to do with a problem that has been 
understood since the ancients, namely the problem of akrasia or weakness of 
the will, which naturalistic interpretation mistakenly explains by appealing to 
the idea of lacking moral fibre or having poor “moral dispositions”. 
  The proponents of moral bioenhancement may tell us about the 
inclinations and neurologically observable processes that influence our 
behavior, but they cannot provide us with an explanation of the normative 
character of our decisions and reasons from which an agent performs the 
action, why I commit myself to act in the way I choose to act. One cannot 
derive the source of self-imposed obligation simply from natural causality36. In 
this sense I argue that the reductionist programme underlying the idea of 
moral transhumanism is limited in principle. The idea of moral enhancement 
rests on certain assumptions that pertain to understanding the moral nature 
of action. Transhumanists believe that  biomedical interventions might result 
in having “morally better motives”. The arguments which they espouse in 
support of this claim rely on consequentialist considerations. Since they focus 
on results and effectiveness of action, they dismiss the normative relation 
between the moral agent and the aim of action37. 
                                                             
36 See Piłat 2013, 170. 
37 See ibidem, 177. 
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3. Autonomy and aiming toward moral perfection 
 
“Does it really matter whether we act as our humanity 
requires, whether we find some ways of identifying 
ourselves and stand by them? But in this case you have no 
option but to say yes. Since you are human you must take 
something to be normative, that is, some conception of 
practical identity must be normative for you. If you had no 
normative conception of your identity, you could have no 
reasons for action, and because your consciousness is 
reflective, you could then not act at all”38.  
 
One is not simply a moral agent and nothing more, but without being a 
moral agent we would deny our humanity. This view demonstrated by 
Korsgaard has two important implications. Firstly, one’s relation towards 
values is constitutive of one’s practical identity. Secondly, and relatedly, the 
consequences of our actions not only impact the world, but also ourselves:  the 
way we chose to act according to our “second order volitions” actually 
constitutes the one who acts. The Nietzschean term “value” contains the idea 
that our “values” are our creations. Similarly, the ancients believed that 
morality is not something that may be “injected” into us from the outside, but 
that it can only be attained by acting morally. In The Human Condition Hannah 
Arendt writes that “in acting and speaking we show who we are, we reveal 
actively our unique personal identities and thus make our appearance in the 
human world, while our physical identities appear without any activity of our 
own in the unique shape of the body and sound of the voice”39.   
 In discussing the problem of the transhumanists approach to values 
and moral insight, I claimed that it consists mainly in focusing on the passive 
aspect of human nature. The point is that we understand ourselves not only as 
subjects of experiences, but in the first place as autonomous agents. A 
significant account of personal autonomy has been given by Habermas40. This 
concept has laid the basis of the central premise in his arguments against the 
transhumanist stance. Morality cannot do without one’s autonomous 
                                                             
38 Korsgaard 2003, 123. 
39 Arendt 1998, 179. 
40 See Habermas 2003. 
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approach to norms and values. “Capacity for reflective self-evaluation” means 
that we can shape ourselves through this evaluation. Furthermore, this 
evaluation entails responsibility. Charles Taylor emphasizes that it is this kind 
of evaluation which one may regard to be essential to the notion of the self. 
The term “evaluate” implies that this is something we do, that our evaluations 
emerge from our activity of evaluating, and in this sense are our 
responsibility41.  
Moral development requires self-understanding, acting subjects who 
directs their own intentions and attributes responsible authorship for their 
actions to themselves. All this happens in the space between knowing the good 
and doing the good. And of this particular space Harris says that it is a region 
entirely inhabited by freedom42. Freedom is the condition sine qua non of the 
realization of our own action, which in turn allows us to create our practical 
identity. These two points are inextricably related. The autonomy of one’s 
relation towards values is crucial to the self-understanding subject. This is not, 
of course, to suggest that what is involved here is an idealistic conception of 
freedom of action. We are not situated outside the world, therefore there is no 
point in holding a concept of freedom that entails being cut off from all 
empirical contexts. Yet, this proposed conception of freedom of action is 
nevertheless a strong one, for freedom here is linked with the concept of the 
rational explanation of action. I believe one finds this sort of argument in 
Habermas’ claim that the motivating power of reasons for action presupposes 
that under certain conditions they are “decisive” for the one who acts, that is, 
they are sufficient to “bind” the agent’s will. Motivation by reasons requires 
not merely a rational, position-taking agent for whom reasons count, but one 
who lets herself be determined by her judgment43. This important conviction 
is precisely what I mean when I state that the problem of moral enhancement 
must bring us back to the concept of autonomy of will and of the self-
determining agent. It is those issues that continue to drive me towards the 
ancient idea of moral excellence, in particular to Aristotle’s theory of virtue. 
                                                             
41 See Taylor 197, 289. 
42 See Harris 2011, 104.  
43 See Habermas 2008, 160. 
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As the above demonstrated concept of a self-determining, acting 
subject reveals, there can be no doubt that biomedical forms of moral 
enhancement are to be regarded as controversial. First, the very idea of aiming 
toward moral perfection requires active agency, and since the proponents of 
transhumanism concentrate on the passive aspect of our nature, they end up 
embracing a reductionist view of morality. Striving for moral excellence 
should stem from one’s own decisions, otherwise we risk the possibility of 
“self-alienation” – of losing, confounding, and abandoning our identity44. The 
forms of moral improvement ought to be adjusted to our grasp of ourselves – 
to us as self-understanding, acting subjects. What we may say with confidence 
is that ethical improvement requires time and experience. It is not only the 
end toward which one strives that truly counts; the very path that leads to this 
end also has significant impact on the one who took it. Let us support this with 
Aristotle, who argues that: 
“Moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its 
name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the 
word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the 
moral virtues arises in us by nature […] the virtues we get by first 
exercising them […] we become just by doing just acts, temperate 
by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts”45. 
In other words, the manner in which one acquires and implements 
moral virtue decides about the “merit” that “constitutes one of the most 
significant determining factors in the axiological structure of man”46. This I 
believe shall never be a matter of biomedical enhancement proposed by the 
new science of behavioural control. The idea of neuro-enhancement that 
pertains to physical ability enhancement, cognitive enhancement (intelligence, 
memory) and natural lifespan enhancement may point to the question of 
becoming “better” human beings, but has nothing to do with the question of 
becoming a better person and improving one’s merit.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
                                                             
44 See President’s Council on Bioethics 2003, 294. 
45 Aristotle 2009, 23. 
46 Stróżewski 2013, 265. 
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The arguments presented in this article are far from exhausting the 
question of what is wrong with the idea of moral enhancement. I tried to 
demonstrate that the moral stakes in the enhancement debate are not fully 
captured if one focuses mainly on calculating the costs and benefits of the 
enhancement. Nor can we grasp them when we ask whether a programme 
could be offered of using knowledge from “the science of morality” to 
deliberately and effectively improve moral dispositions and behaviour47. What 
is truly in question here is the condition of possibility of moral agency itself on 
the one hand, and the complex character of moral decision making on the 
other. In considering moral agency I claimed that it entails autonomy, which in 
turn involves rationality and freedom of the will. The idea of moral 
enhancement simply points to results and the effectiveness of action. But it 
fails to address the issue of the normative relation between the moral agent 
and the aim of action. 
At the end let me invoke Harris’ objection to moral bioenhancement 
which originates from Milton (Book III of Paradise Lost). If there is freedom of 
the will, there has to be the risk of fall.  
 
“When God says of man that ‘he had of me all he could have’ he 
qualifies this in two ways. Firstly by the vainglorious claim ‘I made 
him just and right’, and second by a wonderful analysis of 
freedom: ‘sufficient to have stood, though free to fall’. Milton’s God 
was certainly overestimating her role in making humankind just, 
right and all the rest, but nature, or more particularly, evolution, 
has done most of this for us. We have certainly evolved to have a 
vigorous sense of justice and right, that is, with a virtuous sense of 
morality. God was, of course, speaking of the fall from Grace when 
congratulating herself on making man ‘sufficient to have stood 
though free to fall’; she was underlining the sort of existential 
freedom […] which allows us the exhilaration and joy of choosing 
(and changing at will) our own path through life. And while we are 
free to allow others to do this for us and to be tempted and to fall, 
or be bullied, persuaded or cajoled into falling, we have the 
wherewithal to stand if we choose. So that when Milton has God 
say mankind ‘had of me all he could have’, he is pointing out that 
while his God could have made falling impossible for us, even God 
could not have done so and left us free. Autonomy surely requires 
not only the possibility of falling but the freedom to choose to fall, 
                                                             
47 See Savulescu, Persson 2012. 
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and that same autonomy gives us self-sufficiency; ‘sufficient to 
have stood though free to fall”48. 
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Abstract: In this article I discuss one of the most significant areas of bioethical 
interest, which is the problem of moral enhancement. Since I claim that the 
crucial issue in the current debate on human bioenhancement is the problem 
of agency, I bring out and examine the conditions of possibility of self-
understanding, acting subjects attributing responsible authorship for  their actions 
to themselves. I shall argue that the very idea of moral enhancement, properly 
understood, fails to justify the claims that enhancing the “biological” factor that 
plays a part in the process of making moral choices, whether through biomedical 
or genetic interventions, will actually increase the probability of having “morally 
better future motives”.  
 
Keywords: human enhancement, moral enhancement, human agency, free 
will, freedom, autonomy, normativity 
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